The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade and the Next Tier: The Right to Access by Gaylord \u2794, Thomas Wayne
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Political Science Department
1994
The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade
and the Next Tier: The Right to Access
Thomas Wayne Gaylord '94
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Gaylord '94, Thomas Wayne, "The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade and the Next Tier: The Right to Access"
(1994). Honors Projects. Paper 24.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj/24
-
..
 
The Scope of Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade
 
and the Next Tier: The Right to Access
 
Thomas Wayne Gaylord
 
Political Science
 
Research Honors-Final Revised Edition
 
Dr. Robert Leh
 
05/13/94 
•
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction 
Part I-Abortion Law from Griswold to Casey 
Chapter 1. The Foundation of the Rights to Privacy and 
Abortion 
A. The Right to Privacy 
B. The Right to an Abortion
 
Chapter 2. The Abortion Choice Issues Since Roe
 
A. State- and Federal-Funding 
B. Parental Notification/Consent 
C. Mandatory Waiting Periods 
D. Informed Consent Laws 
E. Mandatory Procedures 
F. Miscellaneous Provisions 
Conclusion-Part I 
Part II-The Right to Clinic Access 
Chapter 3. Access Denied: The Failure of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 
Chapter 4. Access Envisioned: The Victory? of RICO 
Conclusion-Part II 
Conclusion 
•
 
2 
Since the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, 
abortion has occupied a lot of the Court's time and energy. Beyond 
the legalization of the procedure, the Court has had to wrestle with 
several related issues, as well. Ranging from parental consent laws 
to waiting periods, from state- and federal-funding denials to 
procedural regulations, the Court has ruled on many abortion-related 
issues, most of them more than three times. Although most of these 
issues were ruled on in Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern 
Pennsylvania·v. Casey (1992), the Court's invocation of the "undue 
burden" test will probably cause the Court as many headaches as did 
Roe's "trimester fraIllework." 
The aIllbiguity of Roe's 11 trimester fraIllework," a guideline 
designed to set limits on state infringement on the right to choose an 
abortion, caused much of the litigation since. Unlike a judicial "test", 
which is designed to gauge the constitutionality of statutes as they 
come before the Court, the legislative nature of the "trimester 
fraIllework" seemingly was designed to limit, not promote, future 
litigation on the subject. The "trimester fraIllework"'s aIllbiguity 
prevented this from occurring. 
The "undue burden" test will do the SaIlle. It is a classic 
example of judicial doctrine aimed at defIDing a limit past which a 
statute may not advance. However, no limit is defmed by the "undue 
burden" test, only the sorry explanation that a state may not impose 
an "undue burden" on the woman's right to abort. Such aIllbiguity 
can accomplish nothing but more litigation as states such as Missouri 
and Louisiana and Ohio (states always seemingly at the forefront of 
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anti-choice legislation) scramble to write legislation testing what the 
limits on "undue burdens" might be. 
In the meantime, the Court has moved on to a new volatile 
issue, access to clinics where abortions are provided. The scene 
displayed in Wichita, Kansas in the summer of 1991, massive 
protests with little recourse but to jail those protesting to keep clinic 
doors open, and repeated across the nation, has led to enormous 
amounts of litigation in the federal court system as pro-choice groups 
attempt to scale back the threat to clinic access by these "rescues." 
An ill-depth probe of the Court's decision in N.O.l1t: v. Scheidler 
(114 S. Ct. 798; 1994), along with the future of RICO (the 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970) claims in blockade cases, will 
be discussed.. The future of RICO claims is apparently tenuous, 
because of both the proof required to make a racketeering claim 
against the activities of pro-life blockade groups, as well as the 
probable First Amendment speech and assembly rights implications. 
The ambiguity of the "undue burden" test, along with the 
tenuous nature of RICO claims and their basis in abortion clinic 
blockade situations, has opened a new can of litigious worms for the 
Supreme Court in the arena of abortion law. 
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Part I-Abortion Law from Griswold to Casey
 
Chapter 1-The Foundat;ion of the Rights to Privacy and
 
Abortion
 
A. The Right to Privacy 
Nowhere in the United States Constitution did the framers 
specifically grant a right to privacy to the citizens of the United 
States. In fact, not until the landmark 1965 Supreme Court decision 
in Griswoli1 v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479) was such a right "found" 
unambiguously to exist. In Griswold, the Court found that a 
Connecticut law that outlawed the use of contraceptives between 
married persons was violative of a "right to privacy" protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies most 
of the original Bill of Rights to the states) and the Ninth Amendment, 
which states, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." In other words, just because the Constitution does not 
explicitly grant a right to privacy, that does not mean that one does 
not exist. 
The right to privacy was reaffirmed and broadened by the 
Court's holding in the 1972 case Eisenstadtv. Baird. (405 U.S. 438). 
Here, the Court ruled unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute 
outlawing contraceptive distribution to unmarried persons. 
-5 
B. The Right to an Abortion 
Following the Court's rulings in Griswold (1965) and Eisenstadt 
(1972), the Court, in Roe v..Wadeand Doe v. Bolton (both 1973), 
struck down Texas and Georgia criminal abortion statutes, 
respectively. In Roe, the first of the companion cases, the Court 
found a: 
concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, 
. familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the 
Bill of Rights... or among those rights reserved to the 
people by the Ninth Aplendment (Roe, 410 U.S. 113). 
The personal liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment, according to the 
Court, included the right to reproductive choice, to a point. In 
defending its statute, Texas argued that it had a "compelling state 
interest" in outlawing abortion. In order for a state or the federal 
government to disparage a liberty, it must demonstrate that an 
overriding state interest exists. The Roe Court examined three 
possible justifications for Texas's statute. The fIrst was to deter illicit 
sex. The Court gave litt.l;e weight to this argument and spent little 
space in the written decision deciding that no compelling state 
interest in deterring illicit sex warranted a ban on abortion. 
The second was the risk involved in the abortion procedure. 
The Court noted that at the time most abortion statutes were 
enacted, the procedure was very hazardous. However, the 
advancement of medical technology, especially antiseptic techniques, 
has made abortion during the first trimester as safe a procedure as 
childbirth, if not safer. From the end of the first trimester through 
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viability of the fetus (the time when it is capable of surviving outside 
of the womb, roughly at the end of the second trimester when Roe 
was written), abortion appears to be as safe (or as dangerous) as 
childbirth. By the third trimester (post-viability), childbirth is 
statistically safer than abortion. This reasoning, though not in itself 
resulting in a compelling Interest, played a crucial role in what 
became known as the "trimester framework" laid out in Roe. 
The third possible justification for proscribing abortion 
considered by the Court was the State's interest in protecting the 
future life·of an unborn fetus. The State argued that its interest in 
protecting "potential life" (a term used in Texas' statute) overrode 
the right to privacy as it applies to abortion. This concept, too, 
played a role in developing the trimester framework. 
In what many consider the prime example of Court-made law, 
the Roe Court manufactured the trimester framework which was to 
gauge the constitutionality of future state statutes regarding 
abortion. The Court argued that dUring the first trimester of 
pregnancy, there was no compelling state interest overriding a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Therefore, a state may 
place no restrictions on a first trimester abortion, other than that it 
must be performed by a licensed physician (as would most other 
medical procedures). 
During the second trimester, when the abortion procedure 
becomes riskier, the Court found that the state had a compelling 
interest in safeguarding the health of the woman undertaking an 
abortion. Hence, the state may pass regulations related to 
guaranteeing the health and life of the woman, but not the fetus. 
•
 
7 
These regulations, though not specifically outlined may include 
regulating where an abortion mayor may not take place and the like. 
At the point that the fetus becomes viable, the state's 
compelling interest in preserving fetal life takes precedence over the 
abortion right, except in cases of rape and where the life or health of 
the woman would be jeopardized by carrying the fetus to term. With 
these exceptions in place, a state may go so far as to ban all third 
trimester abortions not meeting one of those criteria. It is apparent . 
that in manufacturing the trimester framework, the Court took into 
account both the risk associated with the abortion procedure as 
compared with childbirth, as weUas the point at which the fetus 
becomes viable (viability, in the Court's language, including the 
capability of artificially-sustained life). 
Many took umbrage at the Court's gall to reach such a broad 
decision. Beyond the fact that Roe v. Wade overturned statutes in 
almost every state, the fact that the Court seemed to stretch its 
powers to the limit fazed many. With the Roe decision, the Court 
seemingly rewrote the statutes passed by the legislatures of almost 
every state. However, the Court's action in Roe is not all that unique. 
The Court at times sees what it perceives as constitutional problems 
that simply will not go away unless acted upon. For example, 
another case in which the Court made a similar ruling was County of 
Riverside v. Mclaughlin (SaO u.s. 44; 1991). Decided in 1991, the 
Court changed a preViously ambiguous decision concerning the 
warrantless incarceration of suspects. While pointing out that the 
Court did not like to set arbitrary time limits, the Court did just that, 
ruling that suspects arrested without a warrant could be held no 
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longer than forty-eight hours without a hearing on probable cause. 
In doing so, the Court reasoned that only by doing what it wished to 
avoid, set an arbitrary limit, could they ensure that jurisdictions 
would be forced to end their unconstitutional detentions without 
prolonged litigation. While it may not be quite correct to call the 
trimester framework "arbitrary," as there are obvious reasons for its' 
. . 
set-up (viability and health reasons), the fact that it goes further 
than drawing a line makes it appear legislative in nature, rather than 
judicial. 
White in County ofRiverside the Court seemingly put an end to 
most of the litigation on the subject by making a ruling that was 
open to little interpretation, the Court failed to do so in Roe, thus 
opening a "can of worms" as far as abortion legislation and litigation 
was concerned. The Court, though seemingly hoping to reach the 
same end as in Riverside, an end to vastly time-consuming litigation, 
instead brought upon itself a heap of cases probing the boundaries of 
the "trimester framework." As a gUideline to state legislatures to 
write abortion statutes that passed constitutional muster, the 
"trimester framework" failed miserably, and the Court began hearing 
case after case on state limits on the abortion choice. 
The Court, in fmding the right to privacy and the right to 
choose an abortion in the Constitution without a specific reference to 
them, should be required to clarify those rights as much as possible, . 
lest they become "secondary" to the rights which are specifically 
written into the document. If the right to privacy is so vague, it is 
easily argued that such a right is the mere folly of the Court and does 
not actually exist. The Court should hold itself to stricter standards 
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when defining the unenumerated rights in the Constitution. 
Otherwise, those who disagree may be able to mount a strong 
argument against them, in the process weakening the public 
perception of the wisdom and justice supposedly inherent in our 
highest court. 
Roe has had plenty of detractors, in some cases rightfully so. 
For all the intentions to settle the issue once and for all, Roe opened 
up a huge can of worms in abortion litigation. The Court has had to' 
rule over and over on similar statutes with a certain distinction that 
separates It from the others. For instance, the Court has had to rule 
on single-parent notification laws, and then had to rule on a dual­
parent notification law. In the end, all that is left of Roe, after 
Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (112 S. 
Ct. 2791; 1992), is that a woman retains the right to choose an 
abortion and the state cannot intrude on that choice. Beyond that, 
Casey is now the law of the land where most abortion statutes are 
concerned. Whereas the right to choose may seem very broad, 
indeed the state is only prohibited from taking that choice away. As 
long as a statute does not infringe on the right to choose to have an 
abortion, it now stands a better chance of passing constitutional 
muster. In essence, the state may now place any restriction on the 
right to choose which does not create an "undue burden." Of course, 
the Court has not told us what such a burden would constitute, save 
an all-out ban on abortions. 
I will now examine, issue-by-issue, how the trimester 
framework of Roe v. Wade spawned a generation's worth of 
litigation, with little left to the original decision. 
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Chapter 2-The Abortion Choice Issues Since Roe 
A. State- and·Federal-Funding 
The Supreme Court has heard a handful of cases concerning 
the denial of state and federal funding for abortions. In all cases, the 
Court has upheld bans on government-funded non-therapeutic 
abortions, just as they would likely uphold a ban on government­
funding for non-therapeutic plastic surgery. Although the resultant 
mental heciI.th issues surrounding a patient in either case may be 
vastly different (a child vs. a large nose, for instance), the Court has 
never really paid much credence to issues of mental health in the 
abortion debate. 
The fIrst case the Court heard on abortion funding was Beal v. 
Doe (1977). Beal determined that states were not required to fund 
non-therapeutic abortions under Title XIX of the Social Security Act· 
(Medicaid). States were given broad power to decide what would 
and would not be funded and "[n]othing in the language of Title XIX 
requires a participating State to fund every medical procedure falling 
within the delineated categories of medical care" (Beal, 432 U.S. 438; 
1977). Furthermore, the Court ruled that although a problem may 
arise if necessary treatment was not funded, "it is not inconsistent 
with the Act's goals to refuse to fund unnecessary... medical services"· 
(Beal, 432 U.S. 438; 1977). 
The second case before the Supreme Court addressing the 
funding issue was Maher v. Roe, also decided in 1977. Connecticut 
declined to use state Medicaid funds for abortion while state funds 
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were used to finance childbirth. An action was brought challenging 
this policy as a violation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court found Connecticut's policy to be 
constitutional. According to the Court's reasoning, "[a]n indigent 
woman desiring an abortion is not disadvantaged by Connecticut's 
decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent 
on private abortion services" (Maher, 432 U.S. 464; 1977). Although 
this decision has been upheld, the reasoning here is very misleading~ 
While it is true that an indigent woman is not disadvantaged by the 
decision to fund childbirth, she is disadvantaged by the decision not 
to fund elective abortions. The real reason behind this decision lies 
in the fact that the Court has not granted the indigent suspect 
classification. A grant of suspect classification causes certain groups 
to have a greater amount of weight on their side when they are 
seemingly maligned. Hence, it is much easier to prove discrimination 
against a group with suspect classification, as racial and religious 
minorities have attained. Women and the indigent have not been 
granted such classification. Accordingly, women and the poor are not 
seen by the Court, as racial or religious minorities are, as a class that 
deserves special legal protection. This circumstance, of course, 
makes the abortion dilemma all the tougher for the majority of 
women who seek abortions, the poor ones. Because neither women 
nor the poor have suspect classification, the Equal Protection 
challenge failed. 
In Harris v. McRae (1980), the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which withholds Title XIX 
Medicaid funds from even those abortions deemed necessary. The 
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Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, adding that a state is not 
required to cover the costs of abortions not funded by federal 
Medicaid funds..Following the reasoning of Maher, the government 
need not remove obstacles to abortion not of its own creation "and 
indigency falls within [that] category" (Harris, 448 U.S. 297; 1980). 
In other words, because the government did not make one poor and 
pregnant, the government need not provide any aid to rectify the 
situation. The government would, however, provide aid to a poor 
woman with the flu or to a poor woman electing to give birth. In 
other words, this is a political policy decision not to fund abortions 
and has nothing to do with health-related issues. Legislatures argue 
that the majority of the people do not wish their tax dollars to fund 
abortions, however, the taxpayer has never had a choice as to what 
his or her dollars went to. If this were the real reason behind such 
legislation, there would be larger defense cuts and less money in 
pickle research and the relationship between cattle and methane 
production. 
In 1989, the Court ruled in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services that a state may deny its facilities, funds, and employees to 
abortion services, except in an emergency where the woman's life is 
threatened. According to the Court, "[t]he Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid" (Webster, 
492 U.S. 490; 1989). This was seen as a logical extension of the 
Maher ruling. 
Finally, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), the Court upheld that "none 
of the federal funds appropriated under the [Public Health Service] 
Act's Title Xfor Family planning services 'shall be used in programs 
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where abortion is a method of family planning'" (Rust, 500 U.S. 173; 
1991) as per a directive issued by then-Health and Human Services 
Secretary Louis Sullivan. Here again, the Court upheld a political 
policy that had nothing to do with health issues, but only with the 
fact that the Bush Administration was anti-choice. In a rare case, 
this section of the Act is upheld because the Act's wording 
concerning the power of the H.H.S. secretary is so ambiguous. The 
directive of H.H.S. Secretary Louis Sullivan banning the use of funds' 
could be construed as permissible under the broad language in the 
construction of the Act. As the ban reached so far as to ban even 
counseling, the decision became known as the "gag rule." The "gag 
rule" was criticized by many as impinging free speech and 
endangering the doctor-patient relationship. Not only would a doctor 
at a federally-funded clinic be banned from answering his or her 
patients questions about abortion, the doctor would be required to 
give a prepared speech explaining the clinic's non-involvement in the 
issue of abortion (speaking reams about the Bush Administration's 
eagerness to tum away from anything "unsightly" and merely 
pretend it doesn't exist; "Abortion?, we don't talk about that here"). 
Sullivan's directive was overturned by an executive order signed by 
President Clinton early in his administration. 
B.ParentalNotification/Consent 
Early parental consent laws were generally struck down as too 
harsh by a mid-1970's Court still somewhat liberal regarding the 
abortion issue. However, as states, increasingly lenient, began 
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writing their statutes with available judicial bypasses, the Court, 
increasingly conservative, began to fmd them acceptable. 
The fIrst case dealing with parental consent came from one of 
the three states that have contributed the most to the Court's 
abortion docket, Missouri (the other two being Pennsylvania and 
Ohio). The Court, in Planned Parenthood ofCentral Missouri v. 
Danforth (1976), struck down Missouri's parental consent law which 
required an unmarried woman under eighteen years of age to obtain 
written parental consent prior to obtaining a fIrst trimester abortion. 
The Court·had several problems with this statute. The Court ruled 
here for the first time that a state may not "impose a blanket 
parental consent requirement..." (Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; 1976). 
Additionally, the Court found offensive to Roe v. Wade the fact that 
the statute places new regulations on first trimester abortions, 
something prohibited by Roe's trimester framework. 
In Bellotti v. Baird (1979), the Court struck down a 
Massachusetts parental consent law. In this case, the Massachusetts 
statute required parentalconsent, yet provided for a judicial bypass 
(Le. the Court may override the decision of the parent, or may grant 
consent in the parent's place). However, the minor was still subject 
to a third-party veto of her decision. 
[I]f the superior court fmds that the minor is capable 
of making... an informed and reasonable decision... the 
court may refuse its consent on a finding that a parent's, 
or its own, contrary decision is a better one (Bellotti 
443 U.S. 622; 1979). 
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Furthermore, the statute required an attempt at obtaining parental 
consent prior to invoking the bypass procedure. The Court found this 
to be a harsh measure in that it fails to take into account situations in 
which such action would not be in the minor's best interests. 
In 1981, the Court upheld its first parental notification law, but 
this was based more upon the facts of the specific case rather than 
the constitutionality of the statute. In H.I. v. Matheson, the Court 
upheld a Utah law requiring a physician to notify, if possible, the 
parents of a minor before performing an abortion on that minor. The 
minor in this case, H.L., did not offer any evidence of maturity or 
emancipation, and the Court as such found no reason to strike down 
the statute on its face. Because of H.L.'s immaturity and dependence, 
the statute was held to be reasonable as it applied to her and the 
Court declined to rule as to whether that would be the case with a 
mature or emancipated minor, as is standard procedure. The Court 
will not offer rulings on facts not present in the case before it. 
In 1983, the Court decided two parental consent cases. The 
first was Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, now 
referred to as "Akron 1." This case concerned an Akron, Ohio City 
ordinance which required a minor under fIfteen years of age seeking 
an abortion to receive either parental consent or a judicial bypass. 
The Court stuck down the ordinance following its reasoning in 
Danforth that the ordinance: 
mak[es] a blanket determination that all minors under 
the age of 15 are too immature to make an abortion 
decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor's 
best interests without parental approval (Akron I, 462 
U.S. 416; 1983). 
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Furthermore, the Court did not find that the Ohio Juvenile Court 
operated in such a way as to promote the "opportunity for case-by­
case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors" (Akron I, 462 
U.S. 416; 1983). The Courtapparently believed the O.J.C. to be run in 
a way so as to streamline the judicial process, thereby sacrificing the 
time needed to determine the maturity of the pregnant minors 
before it. 
The second 1983 case was Planned Parenthood ofKansas City, . 
Mo. v. Ashcr(Jft. In Ashcroft, the statute challenged required that 
minors obtain parental c.onsent or a judicial bypass. For the first 
time, the Court found the parental consent statute constitutional as it 
applied to a mature minor. The Court's reasoning, however, relies on 
the assumption, noted by the Court, that the state may not impose a 
parental veto on the decision to abort. This assumption being true, 
the provision of the statute stands as there is no longer a roadblock 
to a mature minor obtaining an abortion. 
The first of two cases heard in 1990, Hodgson v. Minnesota 
(497 U.S. 417), concerned a Minnesota consent law that required 
notification of both parents. This was struck down for simply not 
furthering any state interest not satisfied by single-parent 
notification. 
In 1990, the Court also decided Akron II, Ohio v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, the last case heard by the Court on this 
issue. Challenged here was Ohio's House Bill 319 which requires: 
...the physician provides timely notice to one of the 
minor's parents or a juvenile court issues an order 
authorizing the minor to consent. To obtain a judicial 
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bypass of the notice requirement, the minor must present 
clear and convincing proof that she has sufficient 
maturity or that one of her parents has engaged in a 
pattern of abuse against her... or that notice is not in 
her best interests (emphasis added) (Akron IT, 497 u.s. 
502; 1990). 
The statute was upheld as it satisfied the four criteria set forth in 
Bellotti (1979). First, the minor has the opportunity to prove 
maturity to make the decision regardless of the wishes of her 
parents. Second, the statute, unlike the one struck down in Bellotti, 
. 
requires the Court to consent if it is in the best interests of the minor. 
Third, the bypass procedure virtually ensures the juvenile's 
'. 
anonymity. Finally, the bypass procedure would not cause a delay 
that would cause greater risk to the minor. 
C. Mandatory Waiting Periods 
Some states have tried their hand at passing mandatory 
waiting periods that a woman must comply with prior to procuring a 
scheduled abortion. This is another policy attempt, analogous to the 
"cooling off period" required before purchasing a handgun, that 
states hope will cause pregnant women to reverse their decisions. 
The policy is cloaked in the guise of giving the woman more time to 
process "information" on the abortion procedure. Of course, it also 
wreaks havoc on poor women who must travel a long distance to 
procure an abortion only to be unable to afford an overnight trip to 
satisfy the requirement. The Supreme Court has only heard three 
cases concerning this type of provision. The first, Akron I, was 
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struck down. But, Hodgson's and Casey's provisions were both 
upheld. 
In Akron I, the challenged Akron ordinance required a twenty­
four hour waiting period after consent before a minor may procure 
an abortion. The Court struck down the provision as not furthering 
any state interest. The mandate was found "arbitrary and inflexible" 
and the Court argued that the ordinance would neither cause the 
procedure to be performed more safely, nor serve the state's concern 
that the woman make an informed decision. 
In Hodgson (1990).. however, the Court, while striking down the 
two-parent notification, upheld Minnesota's requirement that a 
minor be subjected to aforty-eight hour waiting period prior to 
undergoing the abortion procedure, effectively overturning the 
decision in Akron I. The Court merely "admitted" they made a 
mistake, and that the waiting period may very well serve an interest 
in prOViding for a more informed decision. 
In Casey (1992), the Court upheld a twenty-four hour waiting 
period for all women seeking an abortion. This case established 
waiting period provisions for all women as constitutional. The effect, 
once again felt by indigent women, is that some abortions may now 
be "more expensive and less convenient," according to the Court, 
apparently also deciding that that is not so bad an effect. Both here, 
and in Hodgson, the Court modified its thinking, deciding that waiting 
periods now did further the state's interest in making sure the 
woman is making a well-informed decision. 
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D. Informed Consent Laws 
The motive behind informed consent laws is twofold. First, the 
state wishes to ensure that certain information is given to a woman 
about to have an abortion..The second, in the eyes of the Court in 
early cases, was to intimidate the woman into not having an abortion. 
Therefore, early versions of informed consent laws were struck 
down, but the Court, in later decisions, has reversed that line of 
thinking. 
The first case to deal with informed consent was Danforth 
(1976). Tl'iat case was brought as a challenge to a Missouri statute 
which required a woman to consent in writing prior to receiving a 
first trimester abortion.. Because this part of the statute was so 
harmless, the Court let it stand, even though most of the rest of the 
statute was struck down. This statute required only the signature 
and did not require any specific dissemination of information. 
The ordinance involved in Akron I (1983) was much stricter. 
Here, it was required: 
that the attending physician inform his patient of the 
status of her,pregnancy, the development of her fetus, 
the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional 
complications that may result from an abortion, and the 
availability of agencies to provide her with assistance 
and information with respect to birth control, adoption, 
and childbirth, and also inform her of the particular 
risks associated with her pregnancy and the abortion 
technique to be employed (Akron I, 462 U.S. 416; 1983). 
The Court found this ordinance to be an unconstitutional 
infringement on the discretion of the physician. "[A] State [does not 
have] unreviewable authority to decide what information a woman 
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must be given" (Akron I, 462 U.S. 416; 1983). (Although in Rust, 
Secretary Sullivan apparently did). Furthermore, the Court found it 
excessive that only a physician (and not some other, trained health 
care provider) may give the patient this information. 
In Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians and 
Gynecologists (1986), the Court struck down another informed 
consent law as harsh as the one in Akron 1. Challenged was the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. The informed consent 
provision required that: 
[the patient] be informed of the name of the physician 
who will perform the abortion, the "particular medical 
risks" of the abortion procedure to be used and of 
carrying her child to term, and the facts that there may 
be "detrimental physical and psychological effects," 
medical assistance benefits may be available for 
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, the father is 
liable to assist in the child's support, and printed 
materials are available from the state that describe the 
fetus and list agencies offering alternatives to abortion; 
[and] requires such printed materials to include a 
statement that there are agencies willing to help the 
mother carry·her child to term and to assist her after the 
child is born and a description of the probable anatomical 
and physiological characteristics of an unborn child at 
"two-week gestational increments" (Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 
747; 1986). 
The Court viewed this statute as "intimidat[ing] women into 
continuing pregnancies." Additionally, the Court ruled that the 
printed materials "are nothing less than an attempt to wedge the 
State's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the 
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician" 
(Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747; 1986). Here, it is interesting to note the 
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Court's inconsistencies. A much more liberal Court upheld the policy 
decisions (that had no health-related value) to disallow state-
funding for abortions, yet the much more conservative Court of 1986 
struck down the policy decisions to disseminate information for 
which a health-related value could be argued! This is a 
phenomenal inconsistency that has yet to be explained in any logical, 
legal manner, and can only be attributed to the forces of society and 
politics. 
However, in the Casey ruling of 1992 the Court reversed its 
decisions concerning informed consent laws. In this case, the Court 
upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring that the patient "be provided 
with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is 
performed" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). The Court's decision 
rested on its overturning of the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade 
and its establishment of the undue burden test (which actually began 
to form in the Webster ruling of 1989, much to Antonin Scalia's 
chagrin). According to the undue burden test, an undue burden 
exists when a law's "purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). Following this new 
standard, the Court disaffrrmed its previous holdings regarding 
informed consent, and here ruled that infonned consent laws did not 
create a substantial obstacle and so did not cause an undue burden 
on a woman's choice to have an abortion. In fact, the Court even 
rejected its past arguments against what it had labeled 
"intimidation." "Measures designed to advance [informed consent] 
should not be invalidated if their purpose is to persuade the woman 
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to choose childbirth over abortion" (Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791; 1992). 
The dissent in Casey, in concurring with the overturning of the 
trimester framework, argues that the undue burden standard is no 
better. The Court, instead of settling the issue, will now have to hear 
case after case on what constitutes a "substantial" obstacle. "The 
undue burden standard... ·has no basis in constitutionallaw and will 
not result in the sort of simple limitation... which the opinion 
anticipates... The standard presents nothing more workable than the 
trimester framework" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). Whether or not 
this will be the case remains to be seen. Since Casey, there has been 
only one case before the Court dealing with the abortion choice. That 
case, Ada v. Guam Society ofObstetricians and Gynecologists (1992), 
was not argued before the Court. The Court, by denying certiorari (a 
petition to the Court to hear an appeal not in conflict among the 
lesser courts), let the decision of the Ninth Circuit of the Court of 
Appeals stand. That decision invalidated a Guam law outlawing all 
abortions except in medical emergencies as unconstitutional on its 
face. 
Of course, proscribing all abortions is such a substantial 
obstacle to a woman's choice that that case is not one to look at to in 
order to predict the future of undue burden tests. 
E. Mandatory Procedures 
Many states have adopted mandatory procedures that must be 
followed in the procurement of an abortion. Examples include 
reporting standards, fetal life preservation techniques, and where 
the abortion must be performed. While most of these have been 
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struck down, in light of Casey, this seems to be the area in which 
most future litigation will arise. 
The first case dealing with this issue was Roe's companion case, 
Doe v. Bolton (1973). The Georgia law invalidated in Doe required 
that the patient must be a Georgia resident, that the abortion must 
be performed in a lCAH-accredited hospital, that the procedure must 
be approved by a hospital committee set up to specifically approve 
abortions, and that the physician's judgment must be concurred in by 
two other doctors. The Court, understandably, found fault with all of 
these requIrements. First, in one of the rare applications of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause'{a clause requiring one state to 
treat those of another state in the same manner) of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court struck down the resident requirement as 
unconstitutional. Second, the Court ruled that not only does the 
procedure not have to take place in a lCAH-accredited hospital, but it 
does not even need to take place in any hospital. In what seems an 
early version of the undue burden standard (albeit, a liberal one), 
the Court rejected the argument that such a requirement was shown 
by the state to further its interest in protecting maternal health. 
Third, the interposition of the committee is "unduly restrictive of the 
patient's rights" (Doe, 410 U.S. 179; 1973). Finally, the Court found 
that the concurrence of two other doctors "has no rational connection 
with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on her physician's right 
to practice" (Doe, 410 U.S. 179; 1973). 
In 1975, the Court heard Connecticut v. Menillo. The Court 
upheld a Connecticut law which criminalized the abortion procedure 
as performed by non-physicians. As this was the only restriction 
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that the Court ruled that the state may place on first trimester 
abortions in Roe, there was nothing to keep Connecticut from passing 
such a statute. 
In Danforth (1976), the Court struck down the part of the 
Missouri statute which required the physician performing the 
abortion to take steps to preserve the fetus, subject to prosecution 
for manslaughter. Here, the Court seemed to reason in a roundabout 
manner. Where the first part of the provision (that the physician 
attempt to pl"eserve the life of the fetus) is deemed impermissible 
regardless· of the stage of pregnancy, the second part (providing 
criminal and civil sanctions) is struck down as being inextricably tied 
to the first. The statute in Danforth also called for reporting and 
recordkeeping by health facilities and doctors providing abortions. 
The Court upheld this provision provided that the anonymity of the 
patient is preserved. Finally, the statute outlawed the use of the 
amniocentesis procedure to induce abortion. The Court struck down 
this provision which outlawed what was, at the time, the safest and 
most widely used technique in the nation. Furthermore, it was the 
technique used for most second trimester abortions. "As an arbitrary 
regulation designed to prevent the vast majority of abortions after 
the fIrst twelve weeks, it is plainly unconstitutional" (Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52; 1976). 
In Colautti v. Franklin (1979), the Court struck down portions 
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required physicians 
to determine fetal viability, if possible, and to try to preserve the life 
of the fetus, subject to criminal prosecution. The viability­
determination requirement was struck down for its ambiguity. "The 
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intended distinction between "is viable" and "may be viable" is 
elusive" (Colautti, 439 U.S. 379; 1979). Likewise, the Court struck 
down the preservation requirement for the same reason. "It is 
uncertain whether the statute permits the physician to consider his 
duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus" 
(Colautti, 439 U.S. 379; 1979). 
The Court heard three cases on these issues in 1983. The first 
case, Akron I (1983), saw the Court strike down two more parts of 
the Akron ordinance concerning this issue. First, the ordinance 
required that all post-fIrst trimester abortions be obtained in a 
hospital. The Court rejected this-portion as Akron presented no 
evidence that it was tailoring its ordinance in such a way as to be a 
"reasonable effort" to limit its effect on women seeking abortions 
(again, an apparent early incarnation of the undue burden test). The 
Court's argument here was that, although the state's interest in 
maternal health becomes compelling after the fIrst trimester, the 
abortion procedure is still reasonably safe throughout the greater 
portion of the second trimester so as to render this part of the 
ordinance as unreasonable for the vast majority of the second 
trimester. The second part struck down required that physicians 
"ensure that fetal remains are disposed of in a 'humane and sanitary 
manner'" (Akron 1,462 U.S. 416; 1983). Although this appears to be 
a reasonable requirement (though maybe more suited for 
environmental control), the time of the Akron I decision appears to 
be at the height of the Court's liberalness regarding its protection of 
abortion and related issues as is evidenced here. The Court struck 
down this provision as "violat[ing] the Due Process Clause by failing 
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to give a physician fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden" (Akron 1,462 U.S. 416; 1983). 
The second of three 1983 cases heard on these issues was 
Ashcroft. Citing Akron I, the Court struck down the part of the 
Missouri statute requiring that all post-first trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital. However, the Court upheld two other 
provisions. First, that a pathology report be prepared for each 
aborted fetus was approved as it entails a small additional cost and 
"does not significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision" 
(once again, a glimpse of undue burden) (Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476; 
1983). Second, the Court upheld the requirement that a second 
physician be in attenciahce for a post-viability abortion. The Court 
argued that this provision furthered the state interest in viable fetal 
life, even though it does not require an attempt to preserve the life 
of the fetus. It appears to be unclear, then, how a second physician 
will further the fetus's benefit if there is no required attempt to 
preserve it. Perhaps, there is no detriment, but there does not 
appear to be any benefit. 
The last 1983 case was Simopoulos v. Virginia. Here, a 
physician was convicted for inducing an abortion at his unlicensed 
clinic. Although the conviction was affirmed by the Court, the Court 
reaffIrmed its decisions in Akron I and Ashcroft that all second 
trimester abortions need not be performed in a hospital. The 
Virginia law, in fact, required that clinics performing second 
trimester abortions be licensed, a regulation that the Court deemed 
as not unreasonable in furthering the state's interest in maternal 
health. 
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Finally, in Thornburgh (1986), the Court affirmed its decisions 
in Danforth and Colautti that it is unconstitutional to require 
physicians to attempt to preserve the life of aborted viable fetuses. 
Here, however, the Court seemingly implies that such a requirement 
could pass constitutional muster if constructed correctly. "Section 
3210(c), by failing to provide a medical-emergency exception... chills 
the performance of a late abortion, which, more than one performed 
at an earlier date, tends to be under emergency conditions" 
(Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747). In other words, most late abortions are 
of an emergency nature. Because the statute requires attempted 
fetal preservation in all cases and not just those that are not 
emergencies, the portion of the statute cannot stand. 
F. Miscellaneous Provisions 
There are, of course, certain statutes that will not conform to 
any of the previous headings. That fact will not allow them to escape 
my attention. 
In two Missouri cases, Danforth (1976) and Webster (1989), 
statutory preambles (non-operative clauses of the statutes) were 
challenged. In Danforth, the state defined "viability" as "that stage of 
fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be 
continued indefmitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life­
supportive systems" (Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; 1976). The Court upheld 
this defmition of viability as consistent with its findings in Roe. 
In Webster, the Court threw out the challenge to the statutory 
preamble as it had no activating powers, and therefore, could in no 
way inhibit any right. That preamble "sets forth 'fmdings' that... 'the 
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life of each human being begins at conception,' and that 'unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being,'" 
(Webster, 492 U.S. 490; 1989). 
The Court has also twice struck down spousal consent laws. 
First, in Danforth (1976), and finally, in Casey (1992). In Danforth, 
the Missouri statute at issue required spousal consent for a first 
trimester abortion. The Court, recognizing the lack of state authority 
to regulate a fIrst trimester abortion ruled that "the State cannot 
'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the [S] tate itself is 
absolutely" and totally prohibited from exercising...'" (Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52; 1976). 
Finally, in Casey, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania's spousal 
notification requirement is unconstitutional. Here, the Court finds 
that such a notification constitutes an undue burden on the choice to 
abort. "A significant number of women will likely be prevented from 
obtaining an abortion just as surely as if Pennsylvania had outlawed 
the procedure entirely" (Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791; 1992). 
Conclusion-Part·J 
The opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) has 
established the constitutionality of most of the preceding issues. 
First, the central holding of Roe v. Wade, that a woman has a 
constitutional right to choose to have an abortion, was reaffrrmed. IIi 
addition, strong informed consent laws were upheld, as were waiting 
periods, parental notification (with a judicial bypass), and reporting 
procedures. The Court's option not to hear Ada also reaffirmed Roe's 
central holding. The right to choose an abortion is apparently safe 
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for a long time. The scope of the Casey decision remains to be seen, 
however. Just as states were willing to test the limits of the 
trimester framework, they are likely just as willing, if not more so, to 
see what they can get awaywith under the eyes of the undue 
burden standard. Clearly, it seems that obstacles to abortion will no 
longer be held to such a strict scrutiny as the one they were under 
the trimester framework. The undue burden test, as it appears in 
Webster and Casey, is a much more lenient tool. 
The undue burden test is much more grounded in judicial 
precedent °than the trimester framework was. Whereas the trimester 
framework had the appearance of legislating, the undue burden test 
has the appearance of any number of "tests" the Court has 
manufactured over the years to reach decisions on various subjects. 
Unfortunately, as a test, the undue burden test accomplishes little in 
both expediency and straightforwardness. The ambiguity of the 
undue burden test will cause many state legislatures to wonder what 
will pass the test and what will not. Many states will undoubtedly 
attempt to make their abortion control laws just a little bit tougher 
than Pennsylvania's, and maybe they'll get away with it. More than 
a few times, even in Roe's companion case, undue burden seemed to 
rear its head before it wholeheartedly superseded the trimester 
framework in Webster and Casey. 
Twenty years after Roe, the choice remains. Perhaps it will not 
take another twenty years to see how Casey will affect that choice. I 
concur in the judgment of Casey's dissenters that there will be much 
tougher cases ahead where the imaginary line delineating what 
constitutes an undue burden and what doesn't will be extremely 
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blurry. How could there not be? There are two ways, neither of 
them likely. The fIrst is that each state will model its abortion 
control statutes after Pennsylvania's and will not test the waters as 
they did with the trimester.framework. That is extremely unlikely. 
Equally unlikely is that the Supreme Court will be wholeheartedly 
satisfied with the decisions of the lower courts and that no two 
jurisdictions will come into conflict with each other, thereby ensuring 
that no case on abortion regulation ever again comes be fore the 
Court. That will not happen, either. 
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Part ll-The Right to Clinic Access 
Chapter 3-Access Denied: The Failure of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 
Here we delve into a different aspect of abortion, not the 
government's regulations and the politics of choice, but the 
government's obligation to prevent non-governmental forces from 
removing that choice. 
Although the harassment suffered by abortion service 
providers and their patients is nothing new, the question of how to 
combat the nationwide tactics of ,groups like Operation Rescue in our 
overburdened courts is. Since the volatile Wichita summer of 1991, 
the nation has been engaged in debate over the rights of women 
seeking an abortion versus the rights of prO-life groups to engage in 
free speech. The lower federal courts have been swamped with 
cases. The Supreme Court has already decided two cases on the 
subject. At issue is whether the blockade tactics ofthe pro-life 
forces are a constitutional invocation of free speech rights, or 
whether they constitute, among other things, extortion. 
In 1991, in Wichita, Kansas, violent abortion clinic blockades 
took place. With the local police force unable to keep the clinics 
open, U.S. District Court Judge Patrick Kelly imposed numerous 
restraining orders and injunctions against Operation Rescue. Kelly 
also called out the U.S. Marshal Service to aid the local police. With 
thousands of protesters being arres'ted for contempt in violation of 
the injunctions, the actions of Judge Kelly seemed fruitless. 
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In fact, in more than thirteen instances since 1989, lower 
federal courts have placed injunctions on Operation Rescue and 
similar organizations, forbidding them from denying access to 
abortion clinics. Eight of these injunctions had been based on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also known as the "K.K.K. Act"). In order to 
support an injunction based on the Act, there must be a showing of 
"class-based animus." In other words, there must be an invidious 
discrimination found with that discrimination coming as the result of 
one's belonging to a certain class, such as being a female. Operation 
Rescue ha~ contended that no such animus exists. Their contention is 
rather that only women seeking abortions are targeted, and that is 
not a class protected under Section 1985(3) (the section of the Act 
providing relief). 
Judge Kelly, and many other federal judges in other 
jurisdictions, found that: 
[t]he blocking of entry into the clinics is not the goal, but 
the means by which the defendants seek to obtain their 
goal. That goal is the elimination of the right to obtain 
an abortion. Necessarily, that goal infringes on the 
rights of women, and the rights of women only. The 
patients of the plaintiffs herein form a gender-based 
class supporting the application of Section 1985(3) 
(Women's Health Care Services, et al. v. Operation Rescue 
National, et al., 773 F. Supp. 265; 1991). 
In making this fmding, Judge Kelly proceeded to the next 
requirement to make a claim under Section 1985(3). 
The plaintiffs in Wichita, and elsewhere, needed to prove a 
violation of their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment 
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of the Constitution. However, such a violation must come about as a 
result of state action, meaning the state must play some role in 
denying that right. In Great Am. Fed. Save & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny 
(442 U.S. 366; 1979), Judge Kelly found the basis for this claim: 
private action which inhibits or thwarts the ability of 
the state to guarantee equal protection may cause the 
state either unwillingly or unwittingly to further the 
ends of the conspiracy. 'If private persons take 
conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the 
cQnstituted authorities from giving or securing equal 
treatment, the private persons would cause those 
. authorities to violate the 14th amendment; the private 
persons would then have violated Section 1985(3)' 
(Women's Health Care Services, 773 F. Supp. 265; 1991). 
Finding Operation Rescue, et ale now in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Judge Kelly reviewed the 1871 Act's right to travel 
provision. 
Here, the plaintiffs need not demonstrate state action; the mere 
evidence of private conspiracy to prevent interstate travel of citizens 
is sufficient. Operation Rescue argued that because it interfered with 
the rights of all persons seeking clinic access, and not just those 
travelling from out-of-stine, the claim fails. Judge Kelly threw out 
that line of reasoning as ludicrous countering "the defendants may 
not escape liability... by the mere expediency of enlarging the scope 
of their conspiracy to include local victims as well" (W.H.C.S., 773 F. 
Supp. 267; 1991). 
Finally, the plaintiffs must prove that injunctive relief (relief 
that ends or preempts the action causing harm) is an available 
remedy under Section 1985(3). Operation Rescue argued that only 
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monetary relief is possible, but Judge Kelly disagreed. "None of the 
arguments advanced by Operation Rescue compels the conclusion 
that injunctive relief, although not expressly provided under Section 
1985(3), may not be granted where money damages would be 
inadequate" (W.H.C.S., 773 F. Supp. 267; 1991). Furthermore, 
according to Judge Kelly, "...the primarily remedial purpose of the 
statute [is not] a bar to the granting of injunctive relief' (W.H.C.S., 
773 F. Supp. 267; 1991). Or, because the statute is written primarily 
to provide relief for harm already established, that does not dismiss 
the opportunity to act to prevent further harm. 
Section 1985(3) claims have been upheld in New York State 
N.O. W., et al. v. Terry, et al. (u.S. Ct. of App.l2nd Circ.-886 F. 2d 
1339); N.O. W., et al. v. Operation Rescue, et al. (U.S. Dist. Ct.lE. Dist. of 
Va.-726 F. Supp. 1483); Cousins, M.D., et al. v., Terry, et ale (U.S. Dist. 
Ct.lN. Dist. of N.Y.-721 F. Supp. 426); Roe, et ale v. Operation Rescue, et 
ale (U.S. Dist. Ct.lE. Dist. of Pa.-710 F. Supp. 577: affirmed by 3rd Circ.­
919 F.2d 857); N.O.It:, et al. v. Operation Rescue, et ale (U.S. Dist. 
Ct.lD.Columbia-747 F. Supp. 772); and Women's Health Care Services, 
et al. v. Operation Rescue-National, et ale (U.S. Dist. Ct.lDist. of Kan.­
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14521). 
Regardless of Section 1985(3) claims, the plaintiffs in all of the 
blockade cases have presented state claims (claims based on the civil 
and criminal laws of the state in which the harm took place), as well. 
The state claims encompass the tortious acts of trespass, interference 
with business relations, and public and private nuisance. Almost 
every jurisdiction faced with these cases have upheld the use of 
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injunctive relief based on state claims if the Supreme Court 
overruled the use of Section 1985(3) to combat the problem. 
As it turned out, the Supreme Court did just that. In the 1993 
case Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, the Court held that 
Section 1985(3) "does not provide a federal cause of action against 
persons obstructing access to abortion clinics" (Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753; 
1993). The Court fIrst ruled that a class-based animus was not 
present to support a Section 1985(3) claim. 
Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion 
. qualifies alongside race discrimination as an 'otherwise 
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 
[underlYing] the conspirators' action...' the 'animus' 
requirement demands at least a purpose that focuses 
upon women by reason of their sex,... Opposition to 
abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect sex­
b~sed intent (Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753; 1993). 
The Court also found that the plaintiffs failed to prove a 
disparagement of their right to travel. . 
Although the right to interstate travel is 
constitutionally protected against private interference 
in at least some contexts, Carpenters makes clear that a 
Section 1985(3) private conspiracy must be 'aimed at' 
that right... [defendants] proposed demonstrations would 
erect 'actual barriers to... movement' only intrastate 
(Zobel v. Williams via Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753; 1993). 
This defeat of the use of Section 1985(3) of the 1871 Civil Rights 
Act did not vacate the injunctions. It only forced them to be upheld 
on the state claims, rather than on Section 1985(3). However, it also 
vacated the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs, because those fees 
were awarded via Section 1988 of the same Act. The state claims did 
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not allow those fees to be awarded in most cases. (A further case 
could be made that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to 
hear those state claims because the federal claims under Section 
1985(3) failed. The Court dismissed that argument. For the District 
Court to have no jurisdiction on the state claims, the federal claims 
would have to be "whollyinsubstantial and frivolous" (Bell v. Hood, 
via Bray). As this was not the case, the District Courts retained 
jurisdiction on the state law claims. 
•
 
37 
Chapter 4-Access Envisioned: The Victory? of RICO 
Because the main motive of challenging the blockades under 
Section 1985(3) was to hurt Operation Rescue, et ale monetarily 
(jailing them for contempt had no effect), attorneys for pro-choice 
groups searched for a new weapon. That weapon is the RICO 
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) provision of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. RICO has both civil and 
criminal p·rovisions and was enacted primarily as a weapon against 
organized crime. Here, it is put t<> a new test. 
RICO is a formidable weapon as it awards treble damages in 
civil suits. The use of RICO against clinic blockades has been upheld 
by the 2nd arid 3rd Circuit Courts of Appeal. However, in N.D. W. v. 
Scheidler (968 F. 2d 612), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that civil RICO could not be wielded for lack of an economic motive· 
on behalf of those participating in the blockade. The Supreme Court 
heard N.D. ~ v. Scheidler on appeal on December 8,1993. 
In arguing for applying RICO to Operation Rescue, et al., N.O.W. 
argued that RICO was violated because: 
the donations they receive from supporters is derived 
from their racketeering activity. The racketeering 
activity is extortion under the Hobbs Act... directed at 
health centers, center employees, and patients...'it is 
well known that the more outrageous and highly 
publicized the activities are, the more likely the RICO 
Defendants and the enterprises are to receive larger 
donations' (N.D.~ v. Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 623; 1993). 
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The District Court and the Seventh Circuit found this argument 
unpersuasive. Instead, the courts ruled that the money was not 
derived from racketeering activities. "The attenuated causal 
connection between the defendants' criminal trespass, threats, and 
vandalism, and their receipt of donations from third parties... is not 
sufficient" to support a civil RICO claim (Scheidler, 968 F. 2d 625; 
1993). As a result, the courts refused to grant that N.O.W. had 
established economic motive and dismissed the cause. 
It appeared likely that the Supreme Court would also rule 
against N.b.W. in this matter. Although two Circuits had allowed the 
RICO claim, the Court has ruled in past opinions that, regardless of 
the broad language in RICO, the Court was reluctant to let RICO 
become a federal tort law. However, the Court did deny certiorari to 
Northeast Women's Center Inc. v. McMonagle.(868 F.2d 1342; 1993) 
which upheld the RICO claim on the Hobbs' Act violation without a 
further finding of economic motive. The Court's reason, therefore, for 
granting certiorari to this case seemed, obviously, either to deny the 
RICO claim based on the findings of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, or to uphold the claim based on McMonagle. Because the 
Court erred somewhat in not hearing McMonagle (the Court usually 
hears cases when lower Appellate Courts are in conflict), it seemed 
that the Court would take the stand that RICO does not provide relief 
in this case. 
As further support for that stance, the Court will generally 
defer to Congress when deciding whether or not to offer a remedy. 
IfCongress has acted in some way on an issue, the Court will 
generally not act contrary to Congress. In mid-November, 1993, both 
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houses of Congress passed legislation making it a federal crime to 
violently obstruct an abortion service facility. As that remedy will 
be available in the near future, the Court, following its own examples, 
would likely not grant N.O.W. the civil RICO claim it asked. 
Although it is not clear that the new legislation will offer any 
more of a remedy than state claims do, the Court, likely, would 
recognize Congress's explicit intent in passing the new legislation, 
and, therefore would not apply RICO in a situation where it was not 
explicitly intended by Congress. 
On January 24, 1994, the Court surprised many. 
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler (114 S. Ct. 798; 
1994), the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals (in Chicago) which dismisseq N.O.W.'s civil RICO 
claims for lack of an economic motive on the part of PLAN (the Pro­
life Action Network, a league of anti-abortion groups including 
Joseph Scheidler). The Court held that the dismissal was in error and 
that the language of RICO was broad enough for such a claim to be 
made. This ruling did not award damages to N.O.W. This ruling 
merely holds that civil RICO claims may be filed without the need for 
an economic motive on behalf of the wrongdoers. 
There were many strong arguments on both sides of this issue. 
The one that may be most important, relating to First Amendment 
rights, was not entertained by the Court. 
First, the intent of PLAN was not in doubt. In Joseph 
Scheidler's own words, from his congressional testimony, the aims of 
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PIAN were lito shut down the clinics and persuade women not to 
have abortions" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). 
N.O.W.'s argument was that PLAN was a "nationwide conspiracy 
to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering 
activity including extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act" (Scheidler, 
114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). These claims appear reasonable, although 
PLAN would probably object to the terms "racketeering" and 
"extortion." According to N.O.W., the extortion ("the obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of 
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear...") on the part of PLAN 
took the form of conspiring to use force, violence and/or fear to keep 
clinic employees and physicians from their jobs, to "give up their 
economic right to practice medicine," and for patients to give up their 
right to receive treatment at the clinics. 
The District Court dismissed the case citing Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 U.S. 127; 
1961): the activities alleged "involved political opponents, not 
commercial competitors, and political objectives, not marketplace 
goals." The District Court and Appellate Court also dismissed based 
on the lack of PLAN's economic motive. It is on this point that the 
Supreme Court's reading of RICO and that of the lower courts' 
differed enormously. 
RICO, in section 1962(a), provides that: 
it 'shall be unlawful for any person who has received any 
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of 
racketeering activity... to use or invest, directly or 
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of 
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such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate 
or foreign commerce' (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798). 
likewise, section 1962(b) of RICO states that: 
it 'shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of an 
, unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or 
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise 
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce' (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 
798). 
In sections 1962(a) and 1962(b),.the "enterprise" referred to is the 
victim acquired through the racketeering activity. Here, the term 
"enterprise" connotes a profit-seeking vehicle and it is this 
connotation tl;lat the lower courts used in determining that PIAN did 
not have an economic motive. The courts ruled that PLAN, through 
its activities, was not seeking to gain control of any profit-seeking 
enterprise, hence, PLAN had no economic motive. 
The Supreme Court, however, relied on the connotation of the 
term "enterprise" as it was used in section 1962(c) of RICO 
In section 1962(c), RICO makes it illegal: 
'for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in , or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt' (Scheidler, 114 S. 
Ct. 798; 1994). 
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It is in this section that the Court finds a different connotation of the 
word "enterprise," one that allows the Court to drop the economic 
motive requirement. 
According to the Court, "[a]rguably an enterprise engaged in 
interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit-seeking motive, 
but the language in [section] 1962(c) does not stop there; it includes 
enterprises whose activities 'affect' interstate or foreign commerce" 
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). Therefore, the connotation of 
"enterprise" ·in this section makes it the vehicle through which the 
harm is done. According to this section, PLAN would be the 
enterprise ,,:,hich 11 affects interstate or foreign commerce" through 
racketeering activities, provided those activities could be proven. 
Using this argument, there need not be an economic motive for 
PLAN, they need only be affecting the interstate commerce of the 
clinics through extortion or other means. Other such means which 
fall within the scope of RICO include any threats involVing murder, . 
arson, obstruction of justice, obstruction of State or local law 
enforcement, interference with commerce, etc. Those are the 
examples which PLAN could be linked to in future cases. RICO is 
much broader, however, adding bribery, mail fraud, gambling, 
tampering, obscene material and other activities. 
The Court did not simply tie the argument up at that point, 
however. Everything does not fall into place that quickly. The Court 
of Appeals, following the example of the Supreme Court in Sedima v. 
Imrex(473 U.S. 479; 1985) believed that the connotation of 
"enterprise" as it appeared in sections 1962(a) and (b) should also 
apply to (c) to restrict the breadth of RICO to that for which it was 
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apparently intended, to be a weapon against organized crime. In 
Sedima, the term "violation" seemed to have differing connotations in 
adjacent sections of the same statute passed by Congress. The Court 
ruled that "we should not lightly infer that Congress intended the 
term to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections" 
(Sedima, 473 U.S. 479; 1985). The Court of Appeals took that to 
mean that they should not infer the term "enterprise" to have a 
wholly different meaning in section 1962(c) than it does in 1962(a) 
and (b). According to the Supreme Court, however, "'enterprise'... 
plays a different role in the structure of those subsections than it 
does in subsection (c)" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). Because in 
subsections (a) and (b) the enterprise is the victim of the 
racketeering activity and in subsection (c) it is the vehicle for the 
racketeering, the Court argues that it is almost necessary to have a 
wholly different meaning. 
Consequently, since the enterprise in subsection (c) is 
not bei..~g acquired, it need not have a property interest 
that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging 
in illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact 
that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity. 
Nothing in subsections (a) and (b) directs us to a 
contrary conclusion (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). 
Hence, PlAN does not require an economic motive to be found liable 
in a civil RICO suit. PlAN need only be found to be engaging in a 
pattern of racketeering activity that is affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce through any of the aforementioned means (Le. extortion). 
There were yet more arguments for the economic motive 
requirement for the Court to sift through, however. One concerned 
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the Appellate Court case U.S. v. Bagaric (706 F.2d 42; 1983). In this 
case, a civil RICO suit against a political terrorist group was dismissed 
for lack of an economic motive. The basis for the dismissal was 
partly the congressional statement of fmdings prefacing RICO and 
referring to the activities of groups that "drain billions of dollars 
from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of 
force, fraud and corruption" (Bagaric, 706 F.2d, at 57). The Appellate 
Court used this statement as one basis for the economic motive 
requirement.. 
The Supreme Court countered, arguing "[w]e... think that the 
quoted statement of congressional fmdings is a rather thin reed upon 
which to base a requirement of economic motive neither expressed 
nor, we think, fairly implied..." (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994). 
The Court has often expressed its desire to interpret statutes 
with the intentions of Congress in mind. Here, the Court calls the 
congressional findings a "rather thin reed," yet the Court has no reed 
at all that shows Congress's intention to wield RICO as broadly as the 
Court wishes to now. In essence, because the Court does not have 
enough evidence for the intentions of Congress to have an economic 
motive requirement, they will follow the route for which they have 
no evidence, only the lack of proof for the contrary. That is quite a 
circular argument that the Court has spun. In other words, the lack 
of evidence for Congress's intentions not to have an economic motive 
requirement is the fact that they have little evidence that Congress 
intended for there to be an economic motive requirement. Disregard 
the fact that there is no positive evidence for no economic motive 
requirement. In this case, for the Court, less is more. The less 
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Congress has said, the more the Court can mold it. And, "Thank God," 
said the Court, "the only thing Congress said were in the 'findings'." 
Instead, it seems likely that the Court felt "compelled" to reach such 
a decision. It is unlikely for Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist (who wrote the decision) to endorse anything 
that may appear to support the right to abort. That would explain 
the failure of the 1871 Civil Rights Act to work in the Bray decision. 
Rather, the Court relied specifically on the language in RICO and 
disregarded what the facts of the case were. The Scheidler decision 
was a theoretically-based, and not a reality-based, decision. In other 
words, the facts of the case were not of paramount importance in 
Scheidler. The Court merely ruled on whether a RICO claim include 
proof of economic motive. It did not matter to the Court that the 
defendants were pro-life. 
Finally, the Court declined to entertain constitutional 
arguments on this subject because they did not pertain to RICO as it 
was argued before the Court in this case. PLAN argued that their 
actions were protected by the First Amendment's rights to speech 
and assembly (although anyone watching the news has seen that 
these "assemblies" are anything but peaceful). However, since none 
of the arguments presented by PLAN questioned the constitutionality 
of RICO's construction, they were a moot point in this matter. One 
can be sure, however, that such arguments will emerge the very next 
time that PLAN is sued under the ambit of civil RICO. 
The following will probably occur. An abortion rights group 
will sue a group of clinic blockaders under civil RICO. The pro-life 
group will move to dismiss, arguing that the present construction and 
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interpretation of section 1962(c) of RICO unconstitutionally infringes 
on their First Amendment rights to speak and peaceably assemble. 
This will likely occur in more than one jurisdiction. It is also likely 
that one District or Appellate Court will dismiss the suit, fmding that 
the pro-life group's argument holds water (just as the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals found PLAN to be a political group and not an 
enterprise under RICO). It is further likely that another District or 
Appellate Court will find in favor of the clinic. The Court, having 
lower courts issuing conflicting rulings, will now have an increasingly 
tougher nut to crack as the issue of First Amendment freedoms 
becomes a part of the civil RICO equation. 
The Court, in the past, has issued rulings in cases contrary to 
what they may have preferred, in order to keep these constitutional 
questions from arising. One such case, noted in Justice Souter's 
concurrence in Scheidler (in which he discussed the First 
Amendment issue), was the aforementioned Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 u.S. 127; 
1961). In this case, the Court held that "antitrust laws do not apply 
to businesses combining to lobby... even where such conduct has an 
anticompetitive effect... because the alternative 'would raise 
important constitutional questions' under the First Amendment" 
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring). 
The Court also stated in Lucas v. Alexander (279 U.S. 573; 
1929) that a law "'must be construed with an eye to possible 
constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its validity'" 
(Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring). Justice Souter 
claims that these two cases do not apply to RICO because they only· 
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matter "when the meaning of a statute is in doubt... and here 'the 
statutory language is unambiguous'" (Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.; 1994, J. 
Souter, concurring). 
In fact, Justice Souter uses some important civil rights cases as 
examples for why an economic motive requirement is unnecessary. 
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware (458 U.S. 886; 1982), the Court 
held that boycotts do not fall under the state common law crime of 
malicious interference with business. And in N.A.A.C.P. V. Alabama 
(357 U.S. 44~; 1958), the Court ruled against Alabama's attempt at 
compelling the N.A.A.C.P. to tum over its membership list. 
Finally, in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla (944 F.2d 
531; 1991), an Appellate Court afforded the respondent with a 
heightened pleading standard for the complaint was based 
on"presumptlvely protected First Amendment conduct" (Scheidler, 
114 S. Ct. 798; 1994, J. Souter, concurring). 
Conclusion-Part II 
likely, almost all civil RICO suits against PLAN will have PLAN 
claiming their actions to be constitutionally protected speech. This 
will not make it easy for N.O.W. or some other appellant to make 
their case, as they will have to overcome stricter standards of 
scrutiny to show why the actions of PLAN should no longer be 
protected by the First Amendment. As I stated earlier, there is 
almost certainty that separate circuits in our Appellate Court system 
will reach disparate conclusions. As such, the Supreme Court will 
have a touchier subject matter to deal with as is almost always the· 
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case when the Bill of Rights is involved. The abortion cases have 
shown us that. 
As it becomes increasingly clear that both the rights of 
pregnant women and the rights of abortion opponents need to be 
protected, it must also be recognized that the tactics of those 
involved in the pro-life movement have not always been legal. 
Many in the pro-life movement have drawn the comparison to the 
civil rights movement, but such acomparison appears to me to be 
fallacious. The movement for civil rights was sanctioned by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection laws, which were passed 
specifically to afford nonwhites the same rights as other (Plessey v. 
Ferguson notwithstanding). The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
confer those rights on the unborn, and "person" as used in the 
Constitution has never been interpreted to include· the fetus. And 
the hypocrisy of those who will profess the value of life and then kill 
in the name of it is beyond any defInition of "civil disobedience." 
The politics of the abortion issue, likewise have and will 
continue to play an important role in the future of abortion litigation 
and legislation. Since Roe v. Wade, the politics of the Court, of the 
Congress, of the President, and of the state legislatures have shared 
more or less equal parts in the shaping of abortion law. In addition, 
the politics and social mores of the American people have directly 
influenced the politics of the aforementioned. It is unlikely that a 
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pro-life Democrat will ever be elected president, at least in the near 
future, although a pro-choice Republican may have a shot. 
Indeed, the conservative Rehnquist Court seemed to follow the 
policy decisions of the Reagan ahd Bush Administrations that largely 
shaped the Court in the Eighties. The "gag rule" and the Webster 
decisions are plain indications of that. Is the Court now influenced 
by the pro-choice politics of the Clinton Administration, however? 
The RICO decision may be an indication that the politics of the sitting 
president may have some influence over the Court at least where 
issues of societal import are concerned. On the other hand, the 
wisdom of the Court can not be overlooked when it came into 
indirect conflict with the wishes of the president. 
Depending on the poll, it is apparent that a slight majority of 
the American people support the right to choose an abortion, 
however, even as that support has risen or fallen since the Roe 
decision, the Court has remained consistent in its inconsistency to 
fully support or abandon its belief in that right. The Court has 
moved from liberal (Roe, 1973) to conservative (Maher, 1977) to 
liberal (Thornburgh, 1986) to conservative (Webster, 1989) to liberal 
(Scheidler,1994). The opinion of America has not been so wishy­
washy. At least where abortion is concerned, the societal mores of 
America have seemed to affect the Court only to the point of keeping 
the choice available and not much further beyond that. 
The Supreme Court may never be silent on the issue of 
abortion. As the Court left still more questions unanswered after 
Casey and Scheidler, we can only watch as the debate over abortion 
continues for another generation. Although I was pleasantly 
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surprised at the ruling in Scheidler (and completely oveIWhelmed by 
the fact that it was a unanimous decision), I can't help but think that 
it merely opened another can of worms. Unless the constitutional 
problem is solved quickly (and quickly in our judicial system may be 
seven-to-ten years), the weapon of civil RICO may never find its 
mark. And, meanwhile, we wonder if America will ever draw 
closure on this subject. 
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